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Comment 
TRACY J. FRAZIER* 
Of Property and Procreation: Oregon’s 
Place in the National Debate over 
Frozen Embryo Disputes 
n October 8, 2008, Oregon entered the national debate over the 
status of a divorcing couple’s cryogenically frozen embryos.1  In 
In re Marriage of Dahl (Dahl), the Oregon Court of Appeals granted 
a wife the right to decide to destroy her and her husband’s frozen 
embryos.2  While married, Dr. Laura Dahl and Dr. Darrell Angle 
unsuccessfully attempted to conceive a child by in vitro fertilization 
(IVF), which left six of their frozen embryos at the Oregon Health & 
Science University (OHSU).3  Before undergoing the initial 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2010.  Managing Editor, 
Oregon Law Review, 2009–10.  The author would like to thank the staff of the Oregon 
Law Review for their work on this Comment, particularly Jun Lim for her outstanding 
editing.  The author would also like to thank Sam Smith and her father, Steve Frazier, for 
their love and support. 
1 This Comment generally refers to the frozen cells as embryos, although the cells are 
scientifically classified as preembryos or zygotes.  See generally CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, 
SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHOOSING HUMAN FUTURES 58–59 (1988).  Preembryo is 
the term for a zygote, or fertilized egg, that has not been implanted into the uterus; the 
preembryo is the category for the first cell stage at which zygotes may be cryopreserved 
during in vitro fertilization.  See Susan L. Crockin, Commentary, “What Is an Embryo?”: 
A Legal Perspective, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1178–80 (2004). 
2 In re Marriage of Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 580, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (2008); see Anna 
Lamut, Oregon State Appeals Court Finds Frozen Embryos “Personal Property” in 
Divorce Proceeding, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG., Oct. 8, 2008, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/ 
digest/bioethics/dahl-v-angle (describing the case as a “novel” decision). 
3 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
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procedure, Dr. Dahl and Dr. Angle entered into a contract with OHSU 
giving Dr. Dahl the power to determine the fate of the frozen 
embryos.4  When the couple divorced, Dr. Dahl exercised her power 
to choose either to donate the embryos for research or destroy them.5  
Her husband, however, vehemently opposed this disposition; he 
believed the embryos should be donated to a couple trying to 
conceive.6 
Frozen embryo disputes are novel in American courts.  In fact, only 
ten disputes concerning frozen embryos have been tried.7  While these 
few cases have led to a large amount of scholarly debate, no legal 
consensus has formed. 
With such little guidance, the Oregon Court of Appeals approached 
the Dahl case by first defining “embryo.”8  Giving the term embryo a 
legal definition was a challenging task; embryos have historically 
escaped a hard and fast definition in our courts in the arenas of 
abortion and stem cell research.9  Therefore, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals was tasked with defining the term frozen embryo in a way 
that would not interfere with an embryo’s legal status in other—most 
notably political—contexts.10 
The Oregon Court of Appeals bypassed a land mine of 
constitutional and ethical questions, defining embryos as marital 
property—the first court to do so.11  After establishing that the 
 
4 Id. at 574–76, 194 P.3d at 836–37 (stating Dr. Laura Dahl had the option of destroying 
the embryos or donating them to science). 
5 Id. at 576–77, 194 P.3d at 837. 
6 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
7 See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 
1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 
(N.Y. 1998); In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 194 P.3d 834, appeal denied, 346 Or. 65, 204 
P.3d 95 (2009); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Roman v. Roman, 193 
S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002), amended 
by, In re Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002).  The last of this line of cases 
was tried after Dahl.  In re Marriage of Nash, 150 Wash. App. 1029 (2009). 
8 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 579–80, 194 P.3d at 838–39; see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
at 594 (“One of the fundamental issues . . . is whether the preembyos . . . should be 
considered ‘persons’ or ‘property’ in the contemplation of the law.”).  For a chart breaking 
down the elements involved in each of these cases, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Whose Life 
Is It Anyway? Texas Public Policy and Contracts to Kill Embryonic Children, 50 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 371, 398 add. (2009). 
9 Lars Noah, Commentary, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research 
Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1138–44 (2004) (characterizing the definition as not 
static, but rather differing amongst different institutions, including medicine and law). 
10 See id. 
11 Lamut, supra note 2. 
 2009] Of Property and Procreation 933 
embryos were marital property, the court used its authority under 
Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 107.105(1)(f)—Oregon’s statute 
governing the distribution of property in a divorce—to determine a 
just and equitable distribution of the embryos.12  In a unanimous 
decision, the court held that there is a contractual right to determine 
the fate of embryos as marital property.13 
As this Comment presents, the definition of embryos used by the 
Oregon Court of Appeals is unsatisfactory.  By defining embryos as 
property subject to Oregon’s marital property laws, the court has not 
only denied the embryos their true status, but also left open much 
room for future disputes.  An analysis of the difficulties that may arise 
by applying this property definition in the future shows that the 
optimal way to protect the parties’ rights and contractual agreements 
in these disputes is for the legislature to regulate IVF clinics, thus 
removing embryos from the ambit of Oregon’s inapposite marital 
property statute. 
This Comment proceeds as follows.  Part I establishes the history 
and background of IVF, the case law in this area, and the analysis 
found therein.  Part II explores the factual and procedural history of 
Dahl and explains the holding of the Oregon Court of Appeals in the 
case.  Part III expounds upon the court’s reasoning and the problems 
that this reasoning presents upon application.  Part IV discusses 
alternative approaches and issues to be analyzed, ultimately 
concluding that the Oregon legislature is better suited than the courts 
to establish the rights of the parties in these disputes.  Part V 
concludes by offering suggestions for legislation that would solve 
many of the issues presented by Dahl. 
 
12 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 578–79, 194 P.3d at 838. 
13 Id. at 585, 194 P.3d at 842. 
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I 
BACKGROUND 
A.  In Vitro Fertilization: A Brief History 
According to statistical data, many couples battle infertility.14  For 
these couples, IVF is a popular means of achieving pregnancy 
because the procedure provides the opportunity to create a child with 
their genetic makeup.15  With over 400,000 embryos in storage and 
more created daily,16 debates surrounding the legal status of embryos 
are inescapable.  Although the procedure is very common, the United 
States has virtually no federal law governing the practice of IVF or 
IVF clinics.17  Very few states have attempted to legislate the issue.18  
Not surprisingly, the struggle to define the embryos frozen for IVF 
attracts attention from many groups, including infertile couples, 
religious groups, and activists on both sides of the abortion dispute.19 
While IVF may be popular, it is still a painful and invasive 
procedure.20  During IVF, a doctor combines a woman’s eggs and a 
 
14 Approximately fifteen percent of women and ten to fifteen percent of men are 
infertile.  See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: 
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 31 fig.19 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf (describing different causes 
of infertility among people using reproductive technologies); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FERTILITY, FAMILY 
PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE 2002 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 2 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf (reporting that in 2002, about fifteen percent of married 
women had impaired fecundity and about 7.4% were infertile). 
15 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a 
Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 113 
(1997) (citing HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 
13 (1994)) (“[T]wo to three million couples [in America] . . . suffer from infertility.”). 
16 Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and 
Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2005). 
17 See Kellie LaGatta, Comment, The Frozen Embryo Debate Heats Up: A Call for 
Federal Regulation and Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 100 (2002). 
18 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111L, § 4(a)(1) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Z-2(b)(1)–(2) (2007). 
19 E.g., Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical of Pope Paul VI on the Regulation of 
Birth (July 25, 1968), in 13 POPE SPEAKS 329–46 (1969), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968 
_humanae-vitae_en.html; cf. Carrie Dowling, Vatican Suggests “Adoption” of Frozen 
Embryos, USA TODAY, July 24, 1996, at 1A (suggesting that embryos should be released 
for adoption rather than destroyed). 
20 Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes 
over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1997) (explaining that 
 2009] Of Property and Procreation 935 
man’s sperm extracorporeal in a petri dish.21  Because the process of 
harvesting a woman’s eggs is invasive and expensive, and repeated 
attempts at implantation are often required, doctors prefer to harvest 
multiple eggs at once.22  The eggs are then fertilized simultaneously, 
creating viable embryos.23  Of these embryos, several will be selected 
for implantation into the woman’s uterus using a transfer catheter,24 
while the others will be frozen in the event that the first implantation 
is unsuccessful.25 
Should a couple separate, divorce, or disagree about how to use the 
embryos during the IVF process, they may turn to the judicial system 
to help them resolve their conflict.  Courts have generally resolved the 
disputes by looking at a number of factual and legal issues. 
B.  Factual Elements Considered in Embryo Disputes 
Certain factual elements must be considered in embryo disputes.  
For instance, courts may look at whether the parties entered into a 
contract (either with each other or with the clinic), which party was 
infertile, and whether state statutory guidance exists.  Much of the 
difficulty in resolving embryo disputes can be attributed to the varied 
facts among the cases—rarely has the exact same scenario presented 
itself twice.26  For instance, in some conflicts a woman prefers to use 
the embryos herself.27  In others, the man may conceivably want to 
implant the embryos into another woman’s uterus.  There is also the 
possibility, as was the case in Dahl, that one of the progenitors wants 
to donate any leftover embryos to other infertile individuals or 
couples.28  In some instances, the disputed embryos represent the last 
 
many doctors describe IVF as an invasive and traumatic experience for the woman seeking 
implantation). 
21 See Kerian, supra note 15, at 114. 
22 Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, “Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants”: 
Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Preembryo Discard Violate the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 188 (1993). 
23 Id. at 187. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 188. 
26 April J. Walker, His, Hers or Ours?—Who Has the Right to Determine the 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos After Separation or Divorce?, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 
39 (2008). 
27 Id. at 50. 
28 See In re Marriage of Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 577, 194 P.3d 834, 837 (2008). 
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chance at reproduction for one or both of the progenitors, further 
complicating the issue emotionally.29 
Because of these factual variations, no bright lines have been 
drawn.  Further, policy, contract law, and marital property law vary 
immensely by state.30  Because all of these areas of law come into 
play in embryo dispute cases, discrepant outcomes are inevitable.  
The last several decades have produced a number of well-publicized 
cases, each with varying facts and legal analyses. 
C.  Case Law Background: Defining the Embryo and Applying a 
Legal Framework 
Although abortion and stem cell research both engender significant 
case law, frozen embryo case law is comparatively sparse.  The first 
instance of such a lawsuit occurred in Tennessee in 1992.31  In Davis 
v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered who should 
receive a divorcing couple’s frozen embryos held in an IVF 
program.32  The following two decades saw nine cases on the issue, 
two of which were decided in 2008 and one decided in 2009.  In each 
instance, the court began by attempting to define the embryo and, 
subsequently, attempting to apply an existing legal framework to the 
dispute to resolve who should be given the decision-making power. 
The three categories widely used to define the embryo are life, 
property, or an amalgamation of the two.33  When analyzing these 
cases, it is immediately apparent that the definition applied to the 
embryo is rarely of great consequence.  In fact, most courts shy away 
from a static definition.  Occasionally, courts either define the embryo 
in the negative by declaring what the embryos are not or adopt a 
definition under the caveat that there is simply no proper legal 
category for embryos. 
The first method of defining the embryo is to define it as life.  Few 
courts have defined a frozen embryo as life, but in 2005, an Illinois 
trial court allowed a wrongful death claim to go forward against an 
 
29 See, e.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262 (Wash. 2002). 
30 For charts outlining the ways in which family law varies state by state, see Am. Bar. 
Ass’n, Family Law Quarterly: Law in the 50 States Charts, http://www.abanet.org/family/ 
familylaw/tables.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
31 See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
32 Id. at 589. 
33 See Donna A. Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for 
Deciding Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
623, 635–36 (1998). 
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IVF clinic that failed to freeze a couple’s embryo properly.34  This 
definition has met resistance.  For instance, many scientists correctly 
assert that biologically a frozen embryo has no chance of survival 
without implantation.35  Therefore, they contend, the embryo should 
be looked at not as a life, but rather as a potential for life.  They may 
instead prefer embryos be classified under the amalgamated 
category.36  This seems to be the stance taken by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as well in abortion decisions.37  In other areas of the law, legal 
personhood is acquired at birth, when the child is separated physically 
from his or her mother.38  Until that point, the fetus is considered part 
of the mother’s body, and her control over the embryo is the by-
product of her personal corporeal autonomy.39  In the fetal homicide 
context, on the other hand, many state statutes include the unborn 
child as “human,” although there is still incongruity among the 
statutes as to when criminal liability for killing a fetus attaches.40  It is 
unlikely that a preembryo would fall under any state’s fetal homicide 
statute.41 
 
34 In Miller v. American Infertility Group, an Illinois trial court judge ruled that a frozen 
embryo is a human being and refused to dismiss a “wrongful death” suit filed on its behalf 
after an IVF program accidentally failed to freeze the embryo.  Miller v. Am. Infertility 
Group, No. 02 L 7394 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. 2005).  However, when the question of 
whether the embryo falls within the ambit of Illinois’s wrongful death statute was certified 
to the Illinois Court of Appeals, the answer came back in the negative.  Miller v. Am. 
Infertility Group, 897 N.E.2d 837, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (answering the trial court’s 
certified questions on interlocutory appeal).  In the abortion context, the country seems to 
be predominantly pro-choice.  Rita Healy, Should Fertilized Eggs Have Rights?, TIME, 
Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1686729,00.html. 
35 See generally Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Susan L. Crockin, On Assisted Reproduction, 
Religion, and Civil Law, 73 FERTILITY & STERILITY 447 (2000). 
36 See generally Ethics Comm., Am. Fertility Soc’y, Ethical Considerations of the New 
Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 895 (Supp. 1986), reprinted in 
SOURCE BOOK IN BIOETHICS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 358 (Albert R. Jonsen et al. 
eds., 1998); Jimmy L. Verner, Jr., Family Law from Around the Nation: Winter 2008, 2009 
ST. B. TEX. FAM. L. SEC. REP., available at http://www.northtexasfamilylawblog.com/ 
2009/02/articles/across-the-nation/family-law-from-around-the-nation-winter-2008/. 
37 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–66 (1973) (discussing the right to abort previable 
fetuses). 
38 Id. at 162. 
39 Id. at 163. 
40 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (defining an 
individual as “a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of 
gestation from fertilization until birth”). 
41 Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble with Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Using 
a Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 143, 157–58 (2009). 
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The second approach, referred to as the property definition, strives 
to give the progenitors the right to decide the disposition of the 
embryos at their sole discretion.42  In this way, the courts have 
intended that the donators of the embryos should merely be able to 
exercise control over their embryos, and the use of “property” in this 
sense does not indicate that embryos should be treated as other forms 
of personal property.43 
In one of the first cases discussing frozen embryos, a federal 
district court in Virginia defined embryos as property, subject to state 
property law.  In York v. Jones,44 the court was asked to decide who 
had dispositional authority over a frozen embryo when the couple 
agreed on its use, but the IVF clinic had actual physical control over 
the embryos.45  The Yorks had entered an IVF program in Virginia 
and later moved to California.46  When they asked to move their 
embryos to a California IVF clinic, the Virginia clinic refused their 
request, contending that the embryos had to be transplanted in Mrs. 
York’s uterus at the Virginia clinic.47  The court held that the Virginia 
IVF clinic was required to surrender control of the embryos to the 
Yorks, likening the Yorks’ relationship to the Virginia clinic to a 
bailor/bailee relationship.48  This relationship, the court elaborated, 
exists right up until the point of viability.49 
Many people find the concept that an embryo is mere personal 
property of the progenitors to be offensive.50  These critics argue 
instead that, while some facets of property law might be applicable, to 
define the embryo as mere property undermines its true nature.  Thus, 
there exists a middle ground commonly referred to as the 
amalgamated life-property model.  Under this model, the embryo is 
 
42 See generally Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in 
Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73 (1995) (advocating that disputes over 
gametic and embryonic tissues should be resolved using a property rights scheme). 
43 See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive 
Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (1998) 
(proposing a framework for parental rights based on property theory). 
44 York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
45 Id. at 424. 
46 Id. at 423. 
47 Id. at 424. 
48 Id. at 425. 
49 Walker, supra note 26, at 61 (citing York, 717 F.Supp. at 424–25). 
50 Robert J. Muller, Note, Davis v. Davis: The Applicability of Privacy and Property 
Rights to the Disposition of Frozen Preembryos in Intrafamilial Disputes, 24 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 763, 795 (1993). 
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still perceived as property, but property that triggers special respect 
and constitutional protection.51  Courts that have adopted this 
definition acquire the leeway to pick and choose which rights they 
want to offer the embryo or the “owner” of the embryo.  It is an 
attractive definition because of its vagueness—it allows the courts to 
use property law, while not stripping away the deference and respect 
that many believe embryos warrant.  Further, courts can avoid having 
to reconcile different bodies of law that may govern the embryo 
depending on its definition. 
The Ethics Advisory Board of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services supports this view.52  Unfortunately, this definition 
has drawbacks as well.53  Though flexible, it both provides the least 
guidance and does not put the public on notice as to how a court will 
handle disputes.  This standard has been applied in Massachusetts, 
where the court in the A.Z. v. B.Z. case consequently avoided having 
to address two inconsistent, and arguably inapplicable, areas of the 
law: child custody and personal property.  Furthermore, several legal 
scholars have observed that the interim standard set forth in Davis and 
followed in A.Z. v. B.Z. will “insulate abortion rights from legal attack 
on the basis that embryos are persons.”54 
The definition of the frozen embryo appears to be largely a 
semantic dispute.  Although every court starts by analyzing the legal 
status of the embryo, the difference it actually makes on the outcome 
of the case is questionable.55  The objective, however, is to determine 
which type of law the court should apply to resolve the dispute.  No 
matter which definition the court adopts, the court may blend legal 
analysis until it believes an equitable solution has been reached. 
 
51 Id. at 781. 
52 See Protection of Human Subjects; HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization 
and Embryo Transfer: Report of the Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,056 
(June 18, 1979). 
53 Id.; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596–97 (Tenn. 1992). 
54 See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved 
Legal Issues in the Transfer of Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169, 
189 (2004).  “In A.Z. v. B.Z., a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis, at least 
with respect to the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an interim category between 
personhood and property . . . .”  Id. at 188 (citation omitted). 
55 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598 (“Although an understanding of the legal status of 
preembryos is necessary in order to determine the enforceability of agreements about their 
disposition, asking whether or not they constitute ‘property’ is not an altogether helpful 
question.”). 
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D.  Applying a Legal Framework 
Arguably more important than how the courts have defined the 
embryos is the courts’ choices of which legal framework to use in 
proceeding.  Regardless of how a court defines the preembryo, 
disputes have proceeded historically under three legal frameworks.  In 
2002, the Iowa Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Witten 
summarized these three frameworks, which are a contractual 
agreement, contemporaneous written consent, and a balance of the 
right against the desire to procreate.56  These principles were 
borrowed from contract, property, family, and constitutional law.57 
1.  Contract 
To begin, couples and the IVF clinic commonly enter into a 
contract that establishes how the couple would like to dispose of any 
unused embryos.58  These contracts are used primarily to protect the 
clinic from liability.  Florida is the only state that imposes a 
mandatory, binding contract for all couples using IVF.59  In other 
states, contracts are not always formed, and when they are, they are 
not always considered binding.  In fact, many courts have found that 
when couples entered into the contract, they did not fully contemplate 
the extent of their agreement.60  Thus, although these contractual 
constructs appear relatively transparent, substantial legal confusion 
remains.61 
The contractual approach is favored for its simplicity—it allows 
the court to follow the letter of the contract that the parties agreed to 
 
56 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Iowa 2003). 
57 See generally Kansas R. Gooden, King Solomon’s Solution to the Disposition of 
Embryos: Recognizing a Property Interest and Using Equitable Division, 30 U. LA VERNE 
L. REV. 66 (2008). 
58 See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing Women’s 
Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 285, 312 (2005). 
59 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005); see also Robyn Shapiro, Who Owns Your 
Frozen Embryo? Promises and Pitfalls of Emerging Reproductive Options, 25 HUM. RTS. 
MAG. 12 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring98/sp98shapiro.html. 
60 See Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to 
Custody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-Embryo, or Pre-Zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or 
Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5th 253, 253 (2001). 
61 See Michael T. Morley et al., Developments in Law and Policy: Emerging Issues in 
Family Law, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 172 (2003) (“Courts have consistently 
refused to enforce contracts . . . that would result in one party becoming a parent against 
his or her will.”). 
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at the time of the IVF, insofar as “they do not violate public policy.”62  
By honoring these contracts, some advocates argue individuals are 
endowed with the power to make personal decisions shielded from the 
reach of the state.63  The contractual framework also brings traditional 
contract defenses and interpretation tools with it, such as intent, 
ambiguity, and gap-filling.64 
In 1995, a New York court applied the contractual framework to 
resolve an embryo dispute case.65  Kass v. Kass concerned a 
disagreement regarding which spouse should receive the frozen 
embryos.66  The parties had signed various consent forms, which 
stated that, in the event of a disagreement, the parties would 
relinquish control of the preembryos to the hospital for research.67  A 
two-justice plurality of the appellate court believed that the couple’s 
prior agreement controlled the embryos’ disposition.68  Two justices 
concluded that the prior agreement was not controlling but disagreed 
as to how the parties’ interests should be balanced.69  One justice held 
that in future disputes, if there is no prior agreement, the objecting 
party should be able to veto a former spouse’s implantation of the 
embryos except in “the most exceptional circumstances.”70 
The Washington Supreme Court also resolved an embryo dispute 
by turning to the parties’ contractual agreement.71  Shortly before 
Becky Litowitz’s marriage to David Litowitz, she had a 
hysterectomy, rendering her unable to achieve pregnancy.72  The 
couple chose to pursue reproduction with IVF, using another woman 
as a surrogate.73  The implantation was successful, but, before the 
 
62 In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (citing Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 
180 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 
48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002)). 
63 Melissa Boatman, Comment, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable 
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 
285, 288 (2008). 
64 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004). 
65 Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), rev’d, 
663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
66 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177. 
67 Id. at 176–77. 
68 Id. at 178. 
69 Id. at 177–78. 
70 Id. at 177. 
71 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 270–71 (Wash. 2002). 
72 Id. at 262. 
73 Id. 
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baby came to term, the couple separated.74  Mr. Litowitz wanted to 
donate the remaining embryos to an infertile couple, while Ms. 
Litowitz preferred that she be granted control so that she could use the 
embryos herself with another surrogate.75  The court ultimately relied 
upon the couple’s prior directive.76  Despite the protests of both Mr. 
and Ms. Litowitz, the court strictly interpreted a cryopreservation 
contract signed by the couple when they first began IVF treatment 
and concluded that the embryos were to be thawed and discarded.77 
The Litowitz case is distinguishable from the other embryo dispute 
cases on two grounds.  First, only one of the parties fighting for the 
preembryos was a donor.  The eggs had been donated from a third 
party and combined with the husband’s sperm to produce the 
preembryos.  Therefore, the court observed that Ms. Litowitz’s 
relationship to the embryos was purely contractual.  Second, the 
couple’s cryopreservation contract provided that the fertility center 
would obtain control of the embryos after five years, unless the 
parties requested an extension.  When making its decision, the court 
observed that it did not know if the preembryos even still existed.78 
In the early 2000s, two state courts rejected similar contracts to 
those relied on in Litowitz and Kass.  In A.Z. v. B.Z.,79 the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts refused to enforce a couple’s agreement that 
the wife could implant the embryos if they divorced.80  The court 
specifically found that the circumstances between the parties had 
changed too drastically from the time the consent form was signed—
in the intervening four years, they had successfully conceived and 
given birth to twins, the wife had obtained a stalking order against the 
husband, the wife had secretly thawed more of the embryos in the 
hopes of having more children, and the husband had filed for 
divorce.81  The court found that the consent form was intended to 
define the relationship between the couple and the clinic and did not 
contemplate these types of changes in the couple’s relationship.82 
 
74 Id. at 264.  The opinion does not discuss who was awarded custody of the child. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 267–69. 
77 Id. at 271. 
78 Id. at 269. 
79 A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
80 Id. at 1057–59. 
81 Id. at 1053, 1057. 
82 Id. at 1056. 
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In J.B. v. M.B., the Supreme Court of New Jersey also rejected a 
couple’s contractual agreement.83  The couple signed a consent form 
with the clinic that granted control to the patient, her partner, and, in 
certain circumstances, the IVF clinic.  In both A.Z. and J.B., the courts 
refused to allow one party to use the embryos against the other’s 
wishes when the couples’ situations had changed from the time they 
entered into the contract.  There is a strong possibility that had the 
contracts prevented the parties in question from using the preembryos, 
as opposed to allowing them to use the preembryos, the contracts 
would have been enforced. 
2.  Contemporaneous Written Consent 
Contemporaneous written consent allows courts to order clinics to 
store the embryos until an agreement is reached between the parties 
and memorialized in writing.84  The court will enforce the parties’ 
specific, express agreement, but the parties retain the right to change 
their minds until the decision is carried out.85  The contract model and 
the contemporaneous consent model share the same underlying 
premise: decisions about the disposition of preembryos belong to the 
couple that created them.  Yet the contemporaneous consent model is 
also rooted in the belief that the parties’ consent matters at the time of 
implantation, not at the time they create the preembryos.86  In this 
way, contemporaneous consent differs from contractual theory—it 
acknowledges people are likely to change their minds.87 
In 2003, the Iowa Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Witten 
(Witten) adopted the contemporaneous written consent model88 and 
held, as King Solomon might have, that neither party was allowed 
access to the embryo without the consent of the other.89  The couple 
had signed an “Embryo Storage Agreement” stating that neither party 
was to remove the preembryo from the IVF clinic without express 
consent from the other.90  Nonetheless, the court also rejected the 
contractual approach used in Kass, noting that “any contract which 
 
83 783 A.2d 707, 711–12 (N.J. 2001). 
84 See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777, 783 (Iowa 2003). 
85 Id. at 777; Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. App. 2006). 
86 Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable 
Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999). 
87 In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777–78. 
88 See Coleman, supra note 86, at 81. 
89 In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777–79. 
90 Id. at 772. 
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conflicts with the morals of the times or contravenes any established 
interest of society is contrary to public policy.”91  The court enjoined 
both parties from transferring or disposing of the embryos without the 
other’s consent.92 
As Witten illustrates, the main drawback to the contemporaneous 
written approach is that it can result in an interminable deadlock; if 
the parties are unable to reach an agreement, then the embryos will 
eventually lose viability in a sort of de facto destruction.93  
Meanwhile, the individuals are left without conclusion or resolution.  
Additionally, no consideration is taken regarding the individual 
circumstances of the parties, which the best interest test accounts for. 
3.  The Balancing/Best Interest Test 
The “balancing” or “best interest” test weighs the interests of both 
parties, while rejecting the necessity of mutual consent and 
contractual enforcement.94  This approach asserts that where parties 
are in disagreement over the disposition of frozen embryos, courts 
should look at the parties individually and evaluate each party’s own 
interest in either the preservation or destruction of the embryos.95  
This framework provides room for considering the parties’ 
constitutional rights to procreation, gender, and fertility. 
In J.B. v. M.B., the Supreme Court of New Jersey applied the best 
interest test to determine which partner should have decisional 
authority over the couple’s frozen preembryos.96  The wife struggled 
with infertility for several years, but through the help of a fertility 
center, the couple successfully conceived a child with IVF.97  The 
facility that conducted the procedure required the husband and wife to 
sign a consent form before treatment.98  The form stated that, in the 
event of divorce, “all control, direction, and ownership” of the 
resulting embryos would belong to the fertility clinic unless otherwise 
determined by a court order.99 
 
91 Id. at 779–80 (citing Liggett v. Shriver, 164 N.W. 611, 612–13 (1917)). 
92 Id. at 783. 
93 Katz, supra note 33, at 631. 
94 In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779. 
95 Id. 
96 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). 
97 Id. at 709–10. 
98 Id. at 709. 
99 Id. at 710. 
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Upon separation, the couple had seven embryos in storage at the 
clinic.100  Consequently, the wife sought a court order requiring that 
the embryos be destroyed, arguing that she had “endured the in vitro 
[fertilization] process” in order to use them “in the context of an intact 
family.”101  The husband filed a counterclaim, requesting the court to 
allow the embryos to be donated to other infertile couples.102 
The parties offered very different bases for their claims, each 
urging that his or her interest was stronger.103  The husband asserted 
that the destruction of the embryos “violated his constitutional rights 
to procreation and the care and companionship of his children.”104  
He argued that these constitutional rights outweighed his wife’s “right 
not to procreate because her right to bodily integrity [was] not 
implicated.”105  Conversely, the wife argued that New Jersey public 
policy prevented forcing individuals into familial relationships.106  
After balancing all the issues, the court concluded that, while there 
were strong arguments to enforce the contract, the “better rule” was to 
allow the parties to change their minds.107  In this instance, that meant 
that the wife’s right not to have a child was stronger than the contract 
the couple signed. 
Although Davis v. Davis is frequently cited as the seminal case in 
support of the contract approach, it also provides an illustration of a 
state appellate court that used a balancing test to form its opinion.108  
In Davis, the parties never executed a contract.109  Thus, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, while holding that such contracts should 
“be considered binding,”110 ultimately used the best interest test.111  
Prior to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the court of appeals reversed 
on the grounds that the unwilling progenitor had the right not to 
reproduce.112  The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 712. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 719. 
108 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992). 
109 Id. at 592. 
110 Id. at 597. 
111 Id. at 604–05. 
112 Id. at 603–04. 
 946 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 931 
decision.113  The court reasoned that in the absence of a prior 
agreement regarding what was to be done when one party no longer 
wished to participate, the parties’ interests were to be balanced.114  
The court found that the party wishing to avoid procreation should 
normally prevail.115  The court went on to state that only if the party 
seeking control of the preembryos has no other reasonable option to 
achieve parenthood, then “the argument in favor of using the 
preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.”116  The 
court specifically mentioned that adoption is a reasonable means of 
achieving parenthood.117 
In a more recent dispute, a Texas appellate court also balanced the 
interests of the parties, relying heavily on constitutional principles to 
bolster its holding.118  On appeal to the First District Houston Court 
of Appeals, the court in Roman v. Roman began by reviewing other 
states’ case law and questioning whether the parties had a 
constitutionally protected right to reproduce.119  The court admitted 
that this was an instance in which science had outpaced the law and 
the courts had been unable to keep up.120  Given the lack of 
legislation or case law on point, the court looked to Texas’s laws 
regarding gestational agreements and children of assisted 
reproduction.121  In light of its findings, the court decided in favor of 
the husband and, hence, for the destruction of the embryos.122  In 
support of its decision, the court stated that “allowing the parties 
voluntarily to decide the disposition of frozen embryos in advance of 
cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind, jointly expressed, 
best serves the existing public policy” of Texas.123 
Unlike the contract approach or the contemporaneous written 
consent approach, the balancing test provides little structure to courts.  
Instead, the test leaves the courts to decide each case on an ad hoc 
 
113 Id. at 604. 
114 Id. at 603–04 
115 Id. at 604. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 43–44 (Tex. App. 2006). 
119 Id. at 45–46. 
120 Id. at 49. 
121 Id. at 48–50. 
122 Id. at 55. 
123 Id. at 50. 
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basis and ultimately avoids a land mine of uncomfortable and difficult 
questions answered by a bright-line rule. 
II 
THE OREGON CASE: IN RE MARRIAGE OF DAHL 
In October 2008, the Oregon Court of Appeals grappled with the 
issue of frozen embryos as a matter of first impression.  The case 
drew significant attention, and many commentators eagerly 
anticipated the court’s analysis of the issue.124 
A.  In re Marriage of Dahl: The Factual and Procedural Background 
Dr. Dahl and Dr. Angle married in March 2000.125  During their 
marriage, the couple had a son by traditional means.126  The couple 
was not able to become pregnant again127 and, in May 2004, enrolled 
in the Fertilization Clinic at OHSU.128  The OHSU staff harvested Dr. 
Dahl’s eggs and combined them with Dr. Angle’s sperm, creating the 
preembryos.129  After several failed attempts at implantation, the 
couple abandoned the pursuit and, shortly thereafter, dissolved their 
marriage.130  When sorting through the terms of the dissolution, they 
agreed on all matters except for one: the disposition of the six 
remaining frozen embryos at OHSU.131 
During the IVF procedure, OHSU and the parties entered into an 
Embryology Laboratory Specimen Storage Agreement (Agreement) 
that contained the terms of the storage and detailed the parties’ ability 
to transfer the embryos and dispose of them.132  As is relevant, a 
section of the Agreement provides: 
 “In connection with requests for transfer . . . or upon termination 
of this Agreement, UNIVERSITY is hereby irrevocably authorized 
and directed to transfer or dispose of the Embryos as follows: 
 
124 See, e.g., Kathleen Gilbert, Oregon Court Orders Frozen Embryos Destroyed, 
Considered “Property Rights” Issue, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Oct. 10, 2008, 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2008/oct/08101008.html. 
125 In re Marriage of Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 574, 194 P.3d 834, 836 (2008). 
126 Id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
127 See id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
128 See id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
129 Id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
130 Id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
131 Id. at 574, 194 P.3d at 836. 
132 Id. at 574–75, 194 P.3d at 836. 
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A. In accordance with the written joint authorization of 
CLIENTS pursuant to the terms of this Agreement . . . or; 
B. If the CLIENTS are unable or unwilling to execute a joint 
authorization, the CLIENTS hereby designate the following 
CLIENT . . . to have the sole and exclusive right to authorize 
and direct UNIVERSITY to transfer or dispose of the Embryos, 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement[.]”133 
Directly below this paragraph, Dr. Laura Dahl’s name and initials 
are printed next to her husband’s initials stating his approval.134  The 
next paragraph asserted that if, prior to any thaw or transfer, a court 
awarded either of the clients the rights with respect to the embryos by 
a decree or an order that is binding and final, then OHSU has the right 
to exclusively deal with the client being awarded such rights without 
liability to the other client.135 
Also in the Agreement, one possible final disposition of the 
embryos was for OHSU to use them in its own laboratory for 
research.136  The Agreement was signed and notarized by the parties 
on May 14, 2004.137 
1.  Trial Court 
At the hearing, the parties adamantly disagreed over what their 
intentions had been when they entered into the contract.138  Dr. Dahl 
asserted that she and her ex-husband had agreed that the embryos 
were to be used for their own procreation; if they decided not to use 
them, then the embryos were to be donated to science.139  Dr. Angle, 
on the other hand, contended that he did not initial that section of the 
Agreement and only remembered signing the last page without 
knowing the rest of the contract’s contents.140  The parties brought 
their dispute to a circuit court in Clackamas County, Oregon.141 
 
133 Id. at 575, 194 P.3d at 836 (emphasis omitted) (last alteration in original). 
134 Id. at 575, 194 P.3d at 836. 
135 Id. at 575, 194 P.3d at 836. 
136 Id. at 576, 194 P.3d at 836. 
137 Id. at 576, 194 P.3d at 837. 
138 Id. at 576, 194 P.3d at 837. 
139 Id. at 576, 194 P.3d at 837.  Dr. Dahl was primarily concerned that if the embryos 
were given to another couple, any resulting children may try to contact her son.  Id. at 576, 
194 P.3d at 837.  She also suggested that “if she were to produce more children 
genetically, she would not want someone [else] to raise them.”  Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
140 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
141 Id. at 572, 194 P.3d at 834. 
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After hearing the parties’ testimony, the trial court found the 
OHSU Agreement to be “[‘]the agreement of the parties,’ that both 
parties had signed the agreement with a notary present, and that it did 
not believe that husband was being untruthful but, rather, that 
husband had an inaccurate recollection of signing the consent 
form.”142  The trial court then ordered the embryos destroyed.143  
“However, [the trial court] further stated that, if the parties jointly 
agreed that the embryos should be donated to medical research, then 
the court would honor that decision for the embryos’ disposition.”144 
2.  Oregon Court of Appeals 
Dr. Angle appealed the trial court’s order that the embryos be 
destroyed.145  He urged the appellate court to award the embryos to 
him under the court’s authority to make a proper and just distribution 
of the parties’ property.146 
The position the parties took regarding the legal definition of the 
embryos warrants some discussion.  Interestingly, although Dr. Dahl 
wanted the embryos destroyed or used for research, her argument 
rested heavily on the proposition that the preembryos were not 
property and, therefore, not subject to Oregon’s marital property 
statute.147  Dr. Angle, on the other hand, wanted the embryos to be 
defined as marital property, even though he adamantly opined that the 
embryos were, in fact, his children.148  The logic behind this position 
is as follows: in a dissolution proceeding, Oregon courts only have the 
authority to distribute marital property.149  Accordingly, if the 
embryos were defined as marital property, then the court could 
distribute them.  Dr. Angle argued that the most just and proper action 
would be to award the embryos to him because preserving the 
embryos as living things trumps his wife’s desire to avoid 
parenthood.150 
 
142 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
143 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
144 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
145 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 837. 
146 Id. at 577, 194 P.3d at 837. 
147 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 837. 
148 Id. at 577–78, 194 P.3d at 837. 
149 See In re Marriage of Massee, 328 Or. 195, 206, 970 P.2d 1203, 1211 (1999) 
(defining marital property). 
150 See In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 577–78, 194 P.3d at 837. 
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In addition to arguing that the embryos were not property, Dr. Dahl 
reasoned that the parties had an unambiguous contract expressly 
vesting her with control of the embryos.151  She asked the court “to 
affirm the trial court’s order to have the embryos destroyed or, 
provided husband agree[d], donated for research purposes.”152  In the 
alternative, Dr. Laura Dahl argued that, even if the embryos were 
marital property, any decision that forces her to be a genetic parent 
was simply not within the court’s power.153 
B.  Holding and Rationale 
The court held that: (1) the embryos fit within the very broad 
category of marital property and, as such, were subject to a just and 
proper disposition in a dissolution proceeding; (2) an order that the 
embryos be destroyed, as preferred by Dr. Dahl, constituted a just and 
proper distribution of that property; and (3) courts should generally 
recognize valid agreements evidencing the parties’ intent regarding 
disposition of their embryos.154 
1.  Defining the Embryos: Observation of Case Law Precedent 
The court stated that it could not identify any express source of 
public policy in either the state’s constitution, statutes, or 
administrative rules or elsewhere that could inform the distribution of 
property of this nature.155  Thus, the court looked to the sparse 
Oregon case law on the subject of defining marital property.156  In 
1999, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a definition from Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary, stating that “‘property’ means 
something that is or may be owned or possessed, or the exclusive 
right to possess, use, enjoy, or dispose of a thing.”157  The Dahl court 
then observed that this definition closely paralleled the language in 
the couple’s contract.158  Although the contract would not control 
 
151 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 837–38. 
152 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 838. 
153 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 838. 
154 Id. at 579–80, 583, 194 P.3d at 838–39, 840–41. 
155 Id. at 578–79, 579 n.3, 194 P.3d at 838, 838 n.3. 
156 Id. at 579, 194 P.3d at 838. 
157 In re Marriage of Massee, 328 Or. 195, 206, 970 P.2d 1203, 1212 (1999) (citing 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1818 (1993)). 
158 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App at 579–80, 194 P.3d at 838–39 (“‘CLIENTS represent and 
warrant that they have lawful possession of and the legal right and authority to store the 
Embryos under the terms of this Agreement.’”). 
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what constitutes personal property, it did serve to indicate that the 
parties understood their rights toward the embryos to be 
possessory.159 
In sum, the appellate court adopted the property definition, but not 
without reservation.  It acknowledged that “there is some inherent 
awkwardness in describing those contractual rights [over the 
embryos] as ‘personal property.’”160  The definition of the embryos as 
marital property merely allowed the court to reach an analysis of the 
contract at hand. 
To determine the enforceability of the couple’s contract, the court 
looked to Kass v. Kass.161  The Kass court had concluded that the 
parties’ contract was a clear manifestation of their intent that the 
embryos be donated to science in the event of divorce.162  The court 
in Kass also noted that, in some instances, these contractual 
agreements might be unenforceable in light of a particular public 
policy or a drastic change in circumstance.163  Because the Oregon 
Court of Appeals found no such public policy issues, it concluded the 
contract between Dr. Dahl and her husband should be upheld.164  
Although the language of the agreement was not specific to this 
particular circumstance, the court found it to be unambiguous and 
conclusive that Dr. Dahl should have control.165 
2.  Oregon’s Marital Property Statute 
Oregon is a common-law property state, which means “that each 
spouse owns the property he or she earns in the marketplace or is 
given” during the marriage.166  While spouses can own property 
jointly, doing so requires an affirmative act.167  However, most 
common-law property states, including Oregon, have evolved to 
function like community property states.168  Community property 
states emphasize the economic union of the spouses by providing that 
 
159 Id. at 579–80, 194 P.3d at 838–39. 
160 Id. at 580, 194 P.3d at 839. 
161 Id. at 581, 194 P.3d at 839; see also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
162 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181. 
163 Id. at 179 n.4. 
164 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 583, 194 P.3d at 840. 
165 Id. at 583–85, 194 P.3d at 840–42. 
166 Leslie Joan Harris, Tracing, Spousal Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions: Puzzles of 
Oregon Property Distribution Law, 83 OR. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2004). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
 952 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 931 
the parties equally own all the other party earns during the 
marriage.169 
Under Oregon’s marital property statute, ORS 107.105, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that each party contributed jointly to property 
acquired during the marriage.170  This is true regardless of the name 
attached to the property.171  The Oregon Supreme Court has 
interpreted this statute as expressly creating two categories of 
property: “marital property,” meaning property belonging to either 
spouse, or “marital assets,” meaning all the property acquired during 
the marriage.172  Marital assets, absent a showing to the contrary, 
must be equally divided.173 
Of course, these definitions and cases had defined property in the 
context of real property or financial affairs.174  The Dahl court 
acknowledged that the property right to the embryos was 
fundamentally unique and distinct from property that has a monetary 
value.175  Yet, the court found that an analogy could be drawn: 
although the embryos did not have title, there were rights associated 
with their possession.176  Thus, a more compelling analogy could 
potentially be drawn between marital property with emotional value, 
as opposed to market value.  Instead of meddling with the emotional 
element of the property in question, the Dahl court examined the just 
and fair distribution of embryos as property pursuant to ORS 
107.105(1)(f).177 
3.  What Constitutes “Just And Proper” Distribution of Embryos? 
Having defined embryos as marital property, the court then 
proceeded to analyze what would constitute a just and proper 
distribution as mandated by ORS 107.105, which provides: 
 
169 Id. 
170 OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f) (2009). 
171 Id. 
172 See In re Marriage of Kunze, 337 Or. 122, 133, 92 P.3d 100, 108 (2004).  There is 
also a third category of property—property that the parties owned at the time they entered 
into the marriage.  Depending on the jurisdiction, this property may or may not be 
divisible upon divorce. 
173 Id. at 134, 92 P.3d at 108. 
174 See, e.g., id. at 133, 92 P.3d at 108; In re Marriage of Pierson, 294 Or. 117, 653 P.2d 
1258 (1982). 
175 In re Marriage of Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 580, 194 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). 
176 Id. at 580, 194 P.3d at 839. 
177 Id. at 579, 194 P.3d at 838. 
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For the division or other disposition between the parties of the real 
or personal property, or both, of either or both of the parties as may 
be just and proper in all the circumstances. . . . The court shall 
consider the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as a 
contribution to the acquisition of marital assets.  There is a 
rebuttable presumption that both spouses have contributed equally 
to the acquisition of property during the marriage, whether such 
property is jointly or separately held.178 
This issue presented a significantly more difficult question for the 
court.  The division of property rarely gives rise to this level of deeply 
emotional conflict and, notwithstanding the idea that some properties 
are unique and personally meaningful, a decision to award particular 
property to a party generally can be considered to be a decision that is 
ultimately measured in monetary (or equivalent) value. 
The trial court concluded that the contract between Drs. Dahl and 
Angle clearly showed their intent.179  Thus, the appellate court held 
that disposing of the embryos in a manner that the parties chose at the 
time they underwent IVF was a just and proper distribution of the 
embryos.180  Had Dr. Angle advanced any affirmative, countervailing 
state policy that would have imposed an unwanted parenthood on Dr. 
Dahl, the court may have found the prior directive to be improper.181  
But as that was not the case, such an analysis did not have to be made. 
III 
LEGAL SCHOLARS SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The subject of embryo disposition has resulted in an astounding 
amount of legal writing.  Legal scholars have suggested that courts 
should end embryo disputes by either focusing on the constitutional 
rights of the parties, the gender of the particular party vying for 
control, or the fertility of that party.  While judicial avenues present 
interesting solutions, the suggestions primarily end in litigation.  As 
described below, the best resolution will be one that keeps the 
majority of disputes out of courts entirely. 
 
178 OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f) (2009). 
179 In re Dahl, 222 Or. App. at 583, 194 P.3d at 840. 
180 Id. at 585, 194 P.3d at 841. 
181 Id. at 578, 194 P.3d at 842. 
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A.  Constitutional Protection: Upholding the Rights of the Progenitor 
The first proposed solution attempts to balance the constitutional 
right to reproduce with the right not to reproduce.182  This concept 
borrows legal analysis from abortion and contraceptive case law.  
Many courts and scholars question whether the law should recognize 
an individual’s right to procreate or not to procreate.183  In a recent 
article titled The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent, Glenn Cohen 
argued, as the title indicates, for the recognition of the right not to 
have genetic childr8en.184  Mr. Cohen maintains that the legal system 
should consider the right not to procreate as a bundle of rights instead 
of a monolithic right.185  This bundle consists of the “right not to be a 
gestational, legal, and genetic parent.”186  Yet others argue that 
“[n]othing in the constitution or elaborating case law states that the 
right to avoid procreation attaches with greater heft than the right to 
procreate.”187 
This argument aside, courts generally conclude that the right not to 
procreate should be stronger.188  These courts reason that the law 
should not impose parenthood on those who do not desire it, as 
parenthood brings with it emotional and financial burdens.  Although 
biological parents can put their children up for adoption, they cannot 
do so until after the child has been born.189  Historically, the courts 
have favored this type of approach; no U.S. court has ever upheld an 
award of implantation.190 
 
182 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715–17 (N.J. 2001); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 
1051, 1052–53 (Mass. 2000). 
183 See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1115, 1196 (2008) (arguing that when examining these cases “it is essential to unbundle 
the possible rights not to be a genetic, gestational, and legal parent, and to recognize that 
the three rights . . . do not stand and fall together”). 
184 Id. at 1116. 
185 Id. at 1121. 
186 Id. 
187 Waldman & Herald, supra note 58, at 312. 
188 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
189 See id. at 591.  See generally Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the 
Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021 
(2004). 
190 Angela K. Upchurch, A Postmodern Deconstruction of Frozen Embryo Disputes, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 2107, 2128 (2007). 
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Lastly, the court may determine that the progenitor who will grant 
life to the embryo should prevail.191  While these courts are few in 
number, many believe that embryos are living beings.  Louisiana is 
one such state, and as of 1986, its state law declares that an embryo is 
a “juridical person” that may only be used for implantation.192  If the 
potential parents decide not to use the embryo, the IVF clinic is 
considered the embryo’s temporary guardian until an adoptive 
implantation can occur.193  The other possibilities of donation for 
research or destruction are prohibited.194  However, given federal 
abortion common law, this state law may exist only in theory, as it 
gives rise to the bizarre scenario of a woman impregnating herself 
with the embryos simply to gain the authority to destroy them.195 
B.  Recognizing Gender Differences 
A large constituency of legal scholars believes women should have 
more control over embryos because women contribute more 
physically to their creation than men.196  It is undeniable that the 
woman has a higher physical burden in creating the embryo for IVF 
use.  Women have to undergo hormone treatment, which poses 
serious possible side effects such as breast cancer and ovarian 
hyperstimulation syndrome.197  The method of extracting the eggs is 
invasive, requiring a doctor to insert a needle into the vagina.198  This 
 
191 See generally A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (discussing one party’s 
argument for implantation but ultimately deciding against it). 
192 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2008). 
193 § 9:126. 
194 See generally Shapiro, supra note 59. 
195 This concept was explored in Davis.  The Tennessee Supreme Court observed that it 
was unlikely that a husband could force transfer of the preembryos to his wife without her 
consent because she had the absolute right to terminate any resulting pregnancy.  Davis v. 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 n.21 (Tenn. 1992).  Therefore, ordering a woman to undergo 
a uterine transfer is an act in futility.  Id.  For an article exploring this concept in more 
depth, see Christina L. Misner, What If Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect 
of Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 265 (1995). 
196 See Waldman & Herald, supra note 58, at 311. 
197 See id. at 321; see also Ronald T. Burkman et al., Infertility Drugs and the Risk of 
Breast Cancer: Findings from the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development Women’s Contraceptive and Reproductive Experiences Study, 79 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 844, 848 (2003); Annick Delvigne & Serge Rozenberg, Epidemiology and 
Prevention of Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS): A Review, 8 HUM. REPROD. 
UPDATE 559, 559–61 (2002) (noting incidents of OHSS during IVF). 
198 See Salem A. El-Shawarby et al., A Review of Complications Following 
Transvaginal Oocyte Retrieval for In-Vitro Fertilization, 7 HUM. FERTILITY 127, 127 
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procedure is both painful and dangerous, as it can lead to punctured 
organs, hemorrhage, or infection.199  Without elaborating, men’s 
contribution to the procedure is much less onerous.  Thus, these 
scholars argue that women should possess the power to control the 
disposition of the embryo because the sex contributes more to its 
creation.200 
In the traditional pregnancy context, a woman can bring the 
pregnancy to term or terminate the pregnancy single-handedly 
because of the legal control she has over her body.201  Because 
embryos exist outside of the woman in IVF, the reasons to give her 
the decision-making power are not present.202  Therefore, using IVF 
provides both progenitors the opportunity to have a say in the fate of 
the embryo.  Of course, different factors remain; should the man wish 
to bring the embryos to term, he will have to find a willing uterus.203 
This theory is often challenged by drawing an analogy to disputes 
between parents over the custody of their children;204 in a custody 
decision, the woman is not granted more decision-making power 
because she physically carried the child to term.  Thus, scholars posit, 
when deciding embryo disputes the woman should not be granted 
more power because her contribution was more significant.205 
C.  Considering the Parties’ Individual Fertility 
Scholars have also presented the theory that the infertile partner 
should have more authority to decide the disposition of the 
embryos.206  This argument arises from the fact that the situation is 
infinitely more complex for the partner who cannot simply turn 
around and create more embryos.  IVF is painful, expensive, and 
requires both an egg and sperm, and the option to reproduce in 
 
(2004) (describing procedure and potential of aspiration needle injuring adjacent pelvic 
organs, which may lead to complications). 
199 Nan B. Hildebrandt et al., Pain Experience During Transvaginal Aspiration of 
Immature Oocytes, 80 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 1043, 
1044–45 (2001). 
200 Waldman & Herald, supra note 58, at 321–22. 
201 Emily Jackson, Degendering Reproduction?, 16 MED. L. REV. 346, 349 (2008). 
202 Id. at 350. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Katz, supra note 33, at 667–73. 
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another context may not exist.207  For that reason, some have 
suggested that the infertile partner should have first priority to the 
embryos, as this could be his or her last chance at procreation. 
As previously mentioned, women are disproportionately the 
partner who is infertile.208  In this way, Dahl is the factual exception 
to the majority of embryo dispute cases.  Many argue, therefore, that 
ordering embryo destruction disadvantages women, who both have 
invested more physically and have a more limited time to have 
children than men, who may remain fertile well into old age.209 
IV 
AFTER DAHL: A SOUNDER APPROACH 
A.  Keeping Embryo Disputes out of Court 
Our justice system is ill-equipped to resolve this type of legal issue.  
In an adversarial system, disputes are oversimplified and the binary 
focus in which one party wins and one party loses results in 
polarization of the parties.210  The method of discovery discourages 
the open sharing of information and creates hostility between the 
parties.211  Furthermore, our judicial system demands that we classify 
and attribute legal status to the embryo.  As mentioned above, 
embryos generally are classified in three categories: property, life, 
and an amalgamation of the two.  Each of these categories has 
disadvantages.  For example, defining the embryo as a living being 
becomes infinitely more complicated once it is implanted and can be 
aborted.  Similarly, to consider the embryo as property is to ignore its 
potential for human life, subjecting it to sale or conversion.212  The 
question of the embryo’s viability, however, is distinct.  While these 
embryos are hypothetically viable, if left alone they will die—but in 
utero they will live. 
 
207 Id. at 645–66 (examining case law on the disposition of frozen embryos and 
proposing a framework for resolving such issues based on “fertility status”). 
208 Id. at 670. 
209 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (considering the 
various burdens imposed on the relevant parties when confronted with a constraint on 
parental autonomy); Waldman & Herald, supra note 58, at 310; see also MAURA A. RYAN, 
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE COST OF LONGING 71–75 
(2001). 
210 Upchurch, supra note 190, at 2113–14. 
211 Id. at 2116. 
212 Id. at 2132. 
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Further, the selection of the appropriate legal framework in any 
case is shaped by the need to remain consistent with prior legal 
precedent.  Courts interpret or define the nature of the dispute by 
relying on the foundation of the law previously articulated in similar 
contexts—the constraint of precedent forms the foundation for the 
parties’ arguments. 
1.  A Workable Solution: Mandating IVF Contracts and 
Precontractual Counseling 
It is incumbent on the Oregon legislature to regulate embryo 
disposition from the side of the clinics.  In this way, embryo disputes 
can be kept out of court by ensuring that the donors are informed of 
their positions and rights.  Previous contracts and consent forms have 
failed because they violate public policy, are vague, or have expired, 
in the sense that they force a resolution that no longer represents the 
positions of the parties.  Thus, any mandatory consent form must not 
contain these problems.  The following section takes a careful look at 
critiques of contractual preconsent, including the reasons that 
contracts have failed in the past.  Proposed legislation will draw upon 
the strengths of each existing legal framework. 
2.  Arguments Against Contractual Preconsent 
Several legal scholars and courts have critiqued the contract 
approach.213  They argue that this method ultimately fails for several 
reasons.  First, they observe that at the time the parties enter into the 
contracts the possibility of divorce is far from their minds—they are, 
after all, about to create a child.  Similarly, they contend that the 
parties rarely appreciate the terms of the contract they are signing.214  
Second, courts have noted that the environment in which the parties 
are signing is coercive—dispositional agreements that are embedded 
in informed consent documents smack of unconscionability.215  In 
fact, in the case of Dahl, Dr. Angle asserted that he signed the 
 
213 Coleman, supra note 86, at 88–89 (criticizing the widespread view that a partner’s 
interest in a frozen embryo may be waived by private contract, and instead advocating an 
“inalienable right to mutual consent” over decisions involving such embryos, which may 
not be waived by a preexisting contract). 
214 Id. at 89.  In 2000, the only state that dictated contractual ordering for the disposition 
of embryos was Florida.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005). 
215 Jessica L. Lambert, Note, Developing a Legal Framework for Resolving Disputes 
Between “Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions of Divorce 
Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529, 559 (2008). 
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contract without the presence of a notary and without seeing the entire 
document.216  Third, constitutional loopholes provide a means for a 
court to come to any conclusion it sees fit, rendering most preconsent 
contracts null.  While each of these concerns is legitimate, they are 
avoidable. 
3.  Proposed State-Based Legislation 
Regulating the contractual agreements of the parties is an issue best 
left for the state legislature.217  Because family law and property law 
are both primarily creations of statute, it follows that this is where the 
regulation of frozen embryo issues belongs.  Such state-based 
legislation should establish the definition of frozen embryos and 
clearly lay out the requirements of IVF contracts. 
The most effective way of implementing these changes is by 
imposing them on the fertility clinics.  These clinics and their 
administrating doctors should be required to administer consent forms 
that not only establish the liability of the clinic, but also establish the 
available (and unavailable) options for leftover embryos. 
Finally, the legislation should provide a clear framework for how a 
court should address frozen embryo disputes when they inevitably 
arise.  Such a framework could better inform IVF clinicians, who in 
turn will better inform their patients.  This could ultimately lead to 
fewer disputes entering the courts, which, as described below, is a 
desirable outcome. 
a.  Contents of the Consent Contract 
For these consent contracts to be enforceable, they must not allow 
parties to agree on an outcome that violates public policy.  Previous 
case law provides an invaluable source of agreements that have been 
found unenforceable.  Specifically, the contract cannot provide an 
option allowing one of the parties to use the embryos against the 
other’s wishes.  Thus, the consent contract should simply inform the 
parties that neither of them will be able to access the embryos without 
the other’s contemporaneous consent.  The only options that parties 
can agree to in advance are (1) donate the unused embryos to science 
or (2) donate them to an embryo donation program, such as the 
 
216 In re Marriage of Dahl, 222 Or. App. 572, 577, 194 P.3d 834, 837 (2008). 
217 See id. at 585 n.6, 194 P.3d at 841 n.6. 
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Snowflake Frozen Embryo Adoption Program.218  Both of these 
options have consistently been enforced by courts when they were the 
couples’ prior directive. 
The contracts should also require language about the binding 
nature of the agreement and the gravity of the issues.  The 
administering facility should be required to debrief and counsel the 
parties fully as to what they are agreeing to before they sign.  The 
parties should be provided information regarding other parties’      
experiences with embryo disputes.  A waiting period allowing time 
for reflection is also encouraged.  In this way, couples will be 
operating under informed consent to the rights they are creating or 
signing away. 
It is important that the terms of the agreement of the parties vis-à-
vis one another not get lost in the liability waiver with the clinic.  This 
means that the contract must separate the parties’ agreement with the 
clinic from the agreement they make with each other.  Their decisions 
regarding disposition must be carefully distinguished so as to avoid 
any ambiguities of the contract’s purpose. 
b.  Administering the Consent Contract 
A possible way to reduce the likelihood of a later dispute is to go 
one step further and require counseling or mandatory mediation for 
parties who are undergoing IVF.  IVF clinics would provide the 
couple with a counselor to discuss and emphasize the nature of the 
agreement and its implications.  Surprisingly, New Hampshire is the 
only state that requires judicial preauthorization for the approval of 
disposition agreements.219  Nonetheless, it is not alone in observing 
the potential benefits of requiring counseling.  In 1999, the American 
Bar Association published its proposed Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies Model Act.220  The Act expounded upon the 
psychological effects of assisted reproductive technology and 
 
218 Snowflake Frozen Embryo Adoption Program, http://www.nightlight.org/adoption   
-services/snowflakes-embryo/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). 
219 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (2002) (requiring counseling, written 
certification of the counseling, and the health care provider’s evaluation that the person 
participating in the IVF procedure is qualified); see also Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist 
Theory and the Erosion of Women’s Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal 
Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 
103–05 (2005). 
220 See generally AMI S. JAEGER, CO-CHAIR, ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETIC TECHS. 
COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES MODEL ACT (1999), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/ART_modelact1299.pdf. 
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addressed the need for substantial counseling before beginning the 
process.221  The Act, however, was never adopted. 
Because Oregon has swept frozen embryos under the purview of its 
marital property statute, the state should take precaution to inform 
progenitors as to what they are binding themselves to.  The facts of 
Dahl are straightforward; it is easy to empathize with a woman who 
does not wish her embryo to be carried by a stranger against her will.  
But the situation and the relationship between the parties are not 
always so clear-cut.  Therefore, Oregon should ensure that people 
using IVFs are aware of how the court will view their embryos should 
the parties ultimately disagree on their usage. 
CONCLUSION 
With the development of assisted reproductive technologies such 
as IVF, human inventiveness has opened a Pandora’s box of ethical 
and legal issues.  Profound uncertainty exists when parties using IVF 
subsequently disagree about the disposition of their cryopreserved 
embryos.  Perhaps because these technologies implicate some of the 
most intimate human concerns—reproduction, parenting, and 
marriage—both legislatures and the courts have been reluctant to 
speak explicitly about any resolution of the present confusion.  The 
few courts, including Oregon’s, to address the issue of remaining 
embryos have considered the problem within the typical legal 
framework of property and contract interpretation.  But such legal 
construction reduces the embryo to an object and ignores possible 
solutions that would keep many embryo disputes out of court. 
Oregon should look to the IVF contract for resolution, requiring 
parties to agree in advance to the disposition of their embryos and 
preventing them from coming to an agreement that no court will 
enforce.  The legislature should take measures to ensure that would-
be parents understand the gravity of their agreement.  Mandating 
counseling before entering into the contract with the IVF clinic may 
be one such measure.  Ultimately, enactment of such a statute will 
both create a foundation for a more uniform and consistent legal 
setting and ensure a more rational basis for resolving embryo 
disputes. 
 
221 Id. at 6–7. 
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